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Abstract  
 
This paper will address the question of the revolution in Gilles Deleuze’s political 
ontology. More specifically, it will explore what kind of person Deleuze believes is 
capable of bringing about genuine and practical transformation. Contrary to the belief that 
a Deleuzian program for change centres on the facilitation of ‘absolute 
deterritorialisation’ and pure ‘lines of flight’, I will demonstrate how Deleuze in fact 
advocates a more cautious and incremental if not conservative practice that promotes the 
ethic of prudence. This will be achieved in part through a critical analysis of the dualistic 
premises upon which much Deleuzian political philosophy is based, alongside the 
topological triads that can also be found in his work. In light of this critique, Deleuze’s 
thoughts on what it is to be and become a revolutionary will be brought into relief, giving 
rise to the question of who really is Deleuze’s nomad, his true revolutionary or figure of 
transformation? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In concluding a paper titled ‘Nomadic Thought’ delivered to a Nietzsche conference in 
1972, Gilles Deleuze sums up the problem of the revolution as follows: [end of p. 231] 
 
As we know, the revolutionary problem today is to find some unity in our various 
struggles without falling back on the despotic and bureaucratic organization of 
the party or State apparatus: we want a war-machine that would not recreate a 
State apparatus, a nomadic unity in relation with the Outside, that would not 
recreate the despotic internal unity. (Deleuze 2004: 259) 
 
It is no longer the early 1970s, and our world has changed significantly since then. But 
although the question of ‘the revolution’ that troubled the political Left of Deleuze’s 
France has changed in tenor somewhat, the problem which Deleuze refers to in the above 
passage is arguably as pressing now as it has ever been. Recent revolutionary events 
across North Africa, the Middle East and Greece obviously spring to mind, as does the 
ongoing attempt of environmentalists to ‘find some unity’ for their movement, or more 
specifically, a mechanism that can successfully coordinate mass-action in a way that does 
not wait for or rely upon State apparatuses. Others are better placed than I am to comment 
on the particularities of these examples. What I would like to do in this paper, however, is 
not so much speak about the specifics of these struggles, as investigate what Deleuzian 
philosophy and politics has to say about revolutionaries in general. In short, who is, 
according to Deleuze’s practice of thought, a real nomad or revolutionary? Who is it that 
is capable of bringing about genuine and practical transformation? Contrary to the belief 
that a Deleuzian program for change centres on the facilitation of absolute 
deterritorialisation and pure lines of flight, I will demonstrate in this paper how Deleuze 
in fact advocates a more cautious and incremental if not conservative approach – an 
approach, moreover, that is revolutionary precisely because of its distancing from the 
absolute in favour of prudence. 
 
It must be acknowledged from the outset that Deleuze will not exactly provide us with an 
explicit answer to the question in this paper’s title. This is because instead of naming 
names and setting down step-by-step instructions, Deleuze directs his energies towards 
altering our understanding and approach to the question of ‘who is a revolutionary’ and 
the revolutionary problematic it is a part of. Appreciating the nature of this alteration and 
the ontology that underpins it will therefore form the major task of this paper. It will be 
pursued through a close examination of the relevant primary material.1 To begin with, I 
will briefly touch on some of the abiding dualisms in Deleuze’s work that are largely 
responsible for determining the shape and direction for much of his political philosophy. 
Chief among these will be the dualism mentioned in the above quote of the nomad and 
the State. Following [end of p. 232] this initial presentation, which will evidence 
Deleuze’s transdisciplinary practice, I will demonstrate how this basic and well-formed 
dualism is far more complex then it might initially seem. In fact, I will show how 
Deleuze’s political ontology contains not one but two possible nomads, thus calling into 
question the dualistic premises upon which much Deleuzian commentary and Deleuzian-
inspired political thought is based. After distinguishing between these two nomadic 
figures, the question with which Deleuze closes his ‘Nomadic Thought’ essay will be 
rejoined: who really are our nomads today, our true revolutionary figures of 
transformation?2 
 
 
Absolute Nomads 
 
1972 was a big year for Deleuze. This year saw the publication of a number of important 
works, including his much discussed interview with Michel Foucault ‘Intellectuals and 
Power’, and his key essay ‘How do we recognise structuralism?’. More significantly, it 
was in this year that Anti-Oedipus first appeared. But while there is a good chance that 
the participants at the ‘Nietzsche Today’ conference held in the summer of that year at 
Cerisy-la-salle (which included luminaries such as Klossowski, Derrida, Lyotard, Nancy, 
Gandillac and Lacoue-Labarthe) would have been aware of Deleuze’s new philosophical 
direction with Guattari, it is highly unlikely that they would have had any idea what 
exactly he was referring to in his paper by the conceptual distinction between the nomad 
and the State. Indeed, when asked a question by Mieke Taat in the discussion following 
Deleuze’s paper about the incongruity between his current work and certain positions in 
his last book (The Logic of Sense), Deleuze simply responded: ‘I’ve undergone a change’ 
(Deleuze 2004: 261). Four years later Deleuze would elaborate on this curt (and rather 
unsatisfactory) response: 
 
Fortunately I am nearly incapable of speaking for myself, because what has 
happened to me since The Logic of Sense now depends on my having met Félix 
Guattari, on my work with him, on what we do together. I believe Félix and I 
sought out new directions simply because we felt like doing so. […] I believe also 
that this change of method brings with it a change of subject matter, or, vice 
versa, that a certain kind of politics takes the place of psychoanalysis [the method 
of The Logic of Sense]. Such a method would also be a form of politics 
(micropolitics) and would propose the study of multiplicities […]. (Deleuze 2006: 
65-6) [end of p. 233] 
 
Taking advantage of this collaborative material, we find ourselves in a position denied 
the participants at Cerisy to make sense of Deleuze’s understanding and treatment of 
what he referred to as ‘the revolutionary problem today’. What Deleuze is after, to restate 
his presentation of the problematic, is a way of organising a revolutionary movement, or 
more specifically, revolutionary force, that does not end up reproducing what it is 
fighting against in the act of resistance. Pure anarchy is one thing, and at certain times a 
good thing. But such disorganisation is statedly not Deleuze’s objective. For him, the 
question is more exactly: is there a way of organising that is more structured than pure 
anarchy yet avoids the despotic State form? This is Deleuze’s revolutionary problem.3 
His response with Guattari is for the most part strategic, as befits the practical thrust of 
the problem. But it is also ontological. Let us then briefly look at the ontological basis for 
Deleuze’s political philosophy, before specifically turning to his various statements on 
revolutionaries.4 
 
In seeking an alternative kind of organisation to the State form, Deleuze and Guattari 
nominate its historical opponent: the nomad. It is most common for the term ‘nomos’ to 
be associated with the law. Deleuze and Guattari, however, contest this straight 
connotation by emphasising its opposition to the ‘polis’: 
 
The nomos came to designate the law, but that was originally because it was 
distribution, a mode of distribution. It is a very special kind of distribution, one 
without division into shares, in a space without borders or enclosure. The nomos 
is the consistency of a fuzzy aggregate: it is in this sense that it stands in 
opposition to the law or the polis, as the backcountry, a mountainside, or the 
vague expanse around a city (‘either nomos or polis’). (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987: 380)5 
 
The nomad and the State thus form a dualism for Deleuze and Guattari, whereby the State 
works to ‘reclaim’ land by building ‘walls, enclosures, and roads between enclosures’ 
whilst the nomads do not so much tame the earth as populate its expanse, inserting 
themselves into the continually shifting nature of the desert, tundra, etc. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 381). 
 
As this description suggests, the distinction between the nomad and the State is largely 
predicated on their differing relations to space, and more precisely, their distribution of 
and in space. Deleuze had been playing around with this distinction for some time. As he 
explains in Difference and Repetition, there are two types of distribution, one ‘which 
implies a dividing up of that which is distributed’ and another [end of p. 234] which is ‘a 
division among those who distribute themselves in an open space – a space which is 
unlimited, or at least without precise limits’ (Deleuze 1994: 36).6 Moving forward to A 
Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari discover another novel way to describe this 
distinction, employing terms created by the musical composer Pierre Boulez. In his 
musical compositions, Boulez distinguishes between a smooth space-time that ‘one 
occupies without counting’ and a striated space-time that ‘one counts in order to occupy’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 477). These two ways of engaging with sound involve 
contrasting attitudes towards and experiences of space-time. In a striated space, a 
‘standard’ is imposed onto music, providing an organisational structure to which sounds 
then correspond. Frequencies of sound are thus distributed within various intervals 
respective to the breaks that separate them. In a smooth space, on the other hand, 
frequencies are distributed without breaks; there is no transcendent scale from which to 
judge the frequency, for the space-time itself continuously modulates. For this reason, 
smooth space has no boundaries between one interval and another – there is no inside and 
outside – since it is composed entirely of an alteration that continuously expands or 
unravels. 
 
At base, however, all of these distinctions of smooth/striated and nomad/State can be 
traced back to one of the earliest and most enduring of Deleuzian dualisms: Henri 
Bergson’s separation between differences of nature and differences of degree. As 
Deleuze explains in his 1956 essay ‘Bergson’s Conception of Difference’, differences of 
nature are heterogeneous while differences of degree are homogeneous (Deleuze 2004: 
32-51). This means that for a difference of nature to be genuinely heterogeneous, it must 
not merely refer to the difference between two homogeneities, since this would reduce 
heterogeneity to the identity of homogeneities. Therefore, a difference of nature must 
differ first and foremost from itself: what defines a difference of nature is not merely the 
way it differs from other external objects, but the way it differs internally, being 
composed of a heterogeneity on the inside. 
 
Another way that Bergson describes this separation of difference is by employing the 
theory of multiplicities as developed by the mathematician Bernhard Riemann. Following 
Riemann, Bergson distinguishes between metric and nonmetric multiplicities, or in other 
words, those multiplicities that can and cannot be divided without changing in kind. 
Metric multiplicities lend themselves to striation, for they can be easily sub-divided and 
manipulated without changing their nature, only their extensive quantity. Nonmetric 
multiplicities, on the other hand, are smooth, making it impossible to carry out such [end 
of p. 235] operations without changing them in kind or converting a smooth-nonmetric 
multiplicity into a striated-metric one. 
 
This last remark should flag-up why Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology, and in particular 
the theory of multiplicities borrowed from Bergson and Riemann, is of relevance to ‘the 
revolutionary problem’, and more broadly, a form of political analysis that proceeds via 
the study of multiplicities (as the quote I mentioned above on the ‘change of method’ 
refers to).7 If there is a kind of organisation that avoids reproducing the State form, for 
Deleuze and Guattari it will be ontologically composed as a nonmetric or internally 
heterogeneous multiplicity – a smooth space or nomadic organisation that is not only 
‘outside [the State’s] sovereignty and prior to its law’, but ‘of another species, another 
nature, another origin than the State apparatus’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 352). 
 
In light of this radical alterity between the nomad and the State, it is tempting to 
emphasise the destructive power of the nomads and their disorganising effect – their 
process of ‘deterritorialisation’ – and valorise it in contrast to the oppressive power of a 
State apparatus. As Deleuze and Guattari express on many occasions in various registers, 
nomads propagate smooth space by breaking through the walls of striated space in order 
to ‘add desert to desert, steppe to steppe, by a series of local operations whose orientation 
and direction endlessly vary’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 382). Furthermore, the nomad 
doesn’t just differ from the State, but ‘brings a furor to bear against sovereignty’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 352). This furor is for the purposes of undermining and 
abolishing the well-ordered territories of States. Nomads are thus said to be ‘the 
Deterritorialized par excellence’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 381), since their onto-
ethical prerogative and political aspiration is to evade being territorialised and 
sedentarised, whether on a reservation or through the gradual appropriation of their 
smooth space by State forces. 
 
But in drawing this sharp distinction between the nomad and the State we must be 
careful, for although they may differ, it is not the case that nomads are defined by their 
opposition to the State or that they live to fight it. Deterritorialisation and/or destruction 
of the State, Deleuze and Guattari point out, is ‘neither the condition nor the object’ of 
their existence, but at best a ‘supplement’ or ‘synthetic relation’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987: 471). Similarly, it would be mistaken to construe absolute deterritorialisation as the 
defining feature of revolutions or revolutionaries, according to Deleuze. For as was 
illustrated above by his concern for ‘the revolutionary problem’, what Deleuze is after is 
not merely a disorganising force, but more specifically an alternative kind of organization 
– what he hopes for is to find some unity of a particular kind. Playing up the destructive 
or negative aspect of the [end of p. 236] nomad can thus only take us so far – as far as the 
revolutionary problem: if we revolutionaries are opposed to the status quo, then what 
kind of organisation can and could we give rise to, and how will we be able to avoid 
certain forms that we find detestable? Once this problem is posed, it becomes clear that 
the deterritorialising effect of nomads will at most be a component within a larger 
strategy. Subsequently, what is needed is not a further rehearsal of oppositions, the 
constricting State on one side and the deterritorialising nomad on the other, but an 
attempt to move in between these two absolutes in order to determine whether there is a 
nomadic organisation that could satisfy our revolutionary problematic. 
 
 
Real Nomads 
 
Moving beyond the opposition of absolutes towards an analysis as to the underlying 
nature of nomadism is made easier through a recognition that Deleuze and Guattari 
themselves spend much time complexifying and overcoming their dualistic ontology of 
nomad/State, smooth/striated, etc. While the early sections of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
‘Nomadology’ plateau focuses on clearly distinguishing the pure forms of the nomad and 
the State, immediately following the completion of this task Deleuze and Guattari begin 
to unpick and problematise this relation.8 For example, as it turns out, the smooth and the 
striated, for Boulez, are not fixed spaces, but rather undergo transformations whereby one 
becomes the other: 
 
Boulez is concerned with the communication between two kinds of space, their 
alternations and superpositions: how ‘a strongly directed smooth space tends to 
meld with a striated space’; how the octave can be replaced by ‘non-octave-
forming scales’ that reproduce themselves through a principle of spiralling; how 
‘texture’ can be crafted in such a way as to lose fixed and homogeneous values, 
becoming a support for slips in tempo, displacements of intervals, and son art 
transformations comparable to the transformations of op art. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 478)9 
 
And it gets better. Not only do the smooth and the striated meld and alternate into one 
another, but they even do so while remaining the same in nature. To explain this Deleuze 
and Guattari borrow an example from Paul Virilio: the fleet in being (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 387). The purpose of this example is to illustrate how one can spread 
oneself across the entirety of a smooth space, in this case a vector of sea, at once. 
Tactically speaking, a fleet of warships can have the effect of extending itself across an 
expanse of water, simultaneously occupying every crevice [end of p. 237] of the vector 
from its ability to appear at any point without prior notice. This capacity is best 
epitomised by the nuclear submarine, whose power to strike extends across the globe. By 
doing so, however, the State Navy does not convert the sea – the archetypal smooth space 
– into a striated space. Rather, the State harnesses the power of the smooth for the 
purposes of State control. In other words, the smooth is employed by the State as smooth 
for the promotion of striation. The smooth characteristics of the sea are thus maintained, 
but they are redirected by State powers to achieve a level of control that the State on its 
own would be incapable of. 
 
Here we have an excellent reason for why Deleuze and Guattari would say: ‘Never 
believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 500). As 
we can see, in some cases it clearly won’t, and might even aid in the repression of 
nomadic tendencies, even when its nature remains unchanged. Nomadism and smooth 
space are thus not always easy bedfellows – a fact rarely commented on within Deleuze 
studies. For the point Deleuze and Guattari are trying to make here is not only that reality 
is constantly undergoing processes of striation and smoothing, but furthermore that it is 
not always so easy to tell which is which. If the sea can be striated as smooth, then so too 
can the very concrete of cities be smoothed out, to cite another example: 
 
[I]t is possible to live smooth even in the cities, to be an urban nomad (for 
example, a stroll taken by Henry Miller in Clichy or Brooklyn is a nomadic 
transit in smooth space; he makes the city disgorge a patchwork, differentials of 
speed, delays and accelerations, changes in orientation, continuous variations … 
The beatniks owe much to Miller, but they changed direction again, they put the 
space outside the cities to new use). Fitzgerald said it long ago: it is not a question 
of taking off for the South Seas, that is not what determines a voyage. There are 
not only strange voyages in the city but voyages in place: we are not thinking of 
drug users, whose experience is too ambiguous, but of true nomads. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 482) 
 
The earlier suggestion that a space was either smooth-nomos or striated-polis was 
therefore somewhat misleading: it is both, as one becomes the other. In one direction, 
striated spaces are undone from within as urban nomads redeploy the very constructs of 
the city to a smoothing. And in the other direction, the power of smooth spaces are 
harnessed for the purposes of control. Articulating the pure and fixed dualisms of 
nomad/State and smooth/striated is thus only the beginning. While it might be initially 
convenient to abstract the two apart, this is [end of p. 238] only of use insofar as one goes 
on to complexify these abstractions. As Deleuze and Guattari say in the conclusion of A 
Thousand Plateaus: 
 
It is not enough, however, to replace the opposition between the One and the 
multiple, with a distinction between types of multiplicities. For the distinction 
between the two types does not preclude their immanence to each other, each 
‘issuing’ from the other after its fashion. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 506) 
 
Things are, however, even more complicated. Aside from the various tricky relations 
between the two types, it turns out that there are more than two types after all. If the 
nomad and the State are rendered ‘immanent to each other’, it is by virtue of a third 
element: the phylum. As Deleuze and Guattari understand it, the phylum is a 
‘phylogenetic lineage, a single machinic phylum, ideally continuous [and] in continuous 
variation’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 406), that ‘simultaneously has two different 
modes of liaison: it is always connected to nomad space, whereas it conjugates with 
sedentary space’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 415). For this reason, the phylum, when 
conceptualised spatially, is neither smooth nor striated but holey – the Swiss cheese of 
space – since it is expressed in some instances as smoothly spread and in others as 
contracted into a polis (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 413-415). 
 
All of this is a bit abstract, but there is a political point. When Deleuze and Guattari set 
out their version of politics as ‘micropolitics’, they will do so by employing a further 
topological triad that will be related to this spatial setup. As Deleuze remarks in an 
interview on A Thousand Plateaus: 
 
We think lines are the basic components of things and events. So everything has 
its geography, its cartography, its diagram. What’s interesting, even in a person, 
are the lines that make them up, or they make up, or take, or create. Why make 
lines more fundamental than planes or volumes? We don’t, though. There are 
various spaces correlated with different lines, and vice versa […]. Different sorts 
of line involve different configurations of space and volume. (Deleuze 1995: 
33)10 
 
The primacy of lines is another idea that Deleuze had been working on in his days before 
Guattari.11 It is, however, not until the intermediary years between Anti-Oedipus and A 
Thousand Plateaus that Deleuze sets out clearly his analysis of lines in an essay written 
with Claire Parnet, titled ‘Many Politics’. Put briefly, Deleuze claims that all things and 
events are composed of three types of lines. The first line is the line of rigid segmentarity. 
These are the great segments of rich-poor, young-old, health-sickness, and so on, which 
dominate the easily visible and communicable aspects of our social lives (Deleuze and 
Parnet 2002: [end of p. 239] 126). In contrast to this line of rigid segmentation, the 
second line is supple. These second lines are the cracks which split through the lines of 
great segmentary cuts: ‘rather than molar lines with segments, they are molecular fluxes 
with thresholds or quanta’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 124). There is then a third kind of 
line, a line of flight or rupture. On this line, it is ‘as if something carried us away, across 
our segments, but also across our thresholds, towards a destination which is unknown, not 
foreseeable, not pre-existent’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 125).  
 
So far so good – what we have here is a spatialisation of three different aspects and/or 
processes of existence: one that consists of our acquiescence to clearly identifiable 
oppositions, a second that reveals cracks in this façade and various accumulations of 
exceptions to the binary rule, and a third aspect and/or process of life by which we 
become something completely new. But now we reach a problem: how do the various 
spaces we have looked at correlate with these three lines? And more pertinently: which 
line is the nomadic line? Presuming that the molar line of rigid segmentarity aligns with 
the State and the striated, which of the latter two lines belongs to the nomad: the second 
line of ‘mobile and fluent thresholds’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 127) upon which ‘the 
most secret mutations’ occur (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 203), or the third line, the line 
of abstract detachment and absolute becoming? Adequately responding to this question, I 
believe, is of critical importance if we are to make sense of Deleuze’s revolutionary 
politics. To do so, however, is by no means straightforward. Let me demonstrate. 
 
In some instances the answer is obvious. For example, Deleuze and Guattari described 
the three lines at one point as (1) the rigid Roman State, (2) the line of the advancing 
Huns, with their war machine fully directed towards destroying the Roman peace (pax 
romana), and (3) the barbarians caught between the two, who pass from one to the other 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 222-3). The order of presentation has changed here, but the 
nomads are clearly placed on the pure abstract line that comes ‘from the east’ (Deleuze 
1990: 129). But on other occasions, the matter is more confused. For example, from 
pages 130-4 of Deleuze and Parnet’s ‘Many Politics’ essay, the molecular line and the 
line of flight (crack and rupture) appear to be read together, to the extent that Deleuze and 
Parnet even feel the need to defend the apparent dualism that ‘rigid and binary 
segmentarity’ forms with ‘molecular lines, or lines of border, of flight or slope’. And for 
the remainder of this essay, Deleuze and Parnet will often slip between an analysis of 
three to one of two (see Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 130-4 and 141-2). These confusions 
persist throughout A Thousand Plateaus. In one location, for instance, Deleuze [end of p. 
240] and Guattari state that ‘From the viewpoint of micropolitics, a society is defined by 
its lines of flight, which are molecular’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 216). Elsewhere, 
however, Deleuze and Guattari clearly describe the second line as a rhizomatic line in 
distinction to the line of flight, where it is the rhizome that ‘belongs to a smooth space’ 
and constitutes ‘anomalous and nomadic multiplicities’, ‘multiplicities of becoming, or 
transformational multiplicities’ – in short, Bergson’s heterogeneous or non-metric 
multiplicity (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 505-6). Which line is it, then, that is truly 
nomadic, that belongs to a smooth space? Which of these two lines is the line of 
becoming, and on which line does creativity occur? The crack or the rupture, the 
molecular line or the line of flight, the rhizomatic line or the pure abstract line? 
 
There is another problem of significance closely related to this question. When 
Deleuzians speak of the dualisms major/minor, molar/molecular, State/nomad and others 
like them, it is common to associate the ‘major’ term in each set with consolidation, 
stasis, identity and being, while the ‘minor’ term is grouped with dispersion, flow, 
difference and becoming (to name but a few).12 But as we have seen above, the molar and 
molecular are themselves only two of three lines, the third of which – the line of flight – 
is also commonly equated with these same ‘minor’ terms. How then are we to reconcile 
the three lines with Deleuze’s great dualisms? How does three fit into two, and vice 
versa? This problem is often glossed over and/or inadequately explained in the secondary 
literature. There are numerous examples, but let us briefly consider two. In his glossary of 
Deleuzian vocabulary, Francois Zourabichvili explains for us most capably the contrast 
between a line of flight and the process of striation, which proceeds via binary couples. 
He has rather less to say, however, on how lines of flight differ from and relate to 
molecular lines; indeed, Zourabichvili barely admits the existence of these other lines, 
and when he does so he is careful to omit their molecular name, preferring to call them by 
their other moniker – supple (Zourabichvili 2012: 179). Given that Zourabichvili will 
elsewhere directly relate the molecular to the nomadic and the smooth (Zourabichvili 
2012: 182), this omission is certainly most convenient, as it would patently jar with the 
link he also wants to claim between the line of flight and smooth space (Zourabichvili 
2012: 179). 
 
In her essay “Politics as the Orientation of Every Assemblage”, Véronique Bergen goes 
farther than Zourabichvili in explicating Deleuze’s political topology. Bergen, however, 
does not take note of the slippages in Deleuze’s own treatment of the three lines that I 
revealed above; on the contrary, she reproduces them. After [end of p. 241] noting that a 
Deleuzian political ontology is composed of, on the one hand, the molar/molecular 
schema, and on the other, the three lines, Bergen proceeds to predictably align the 
molar/molecular schema with various other Deleuzian dualisms, such as actual/virtual, 
macroscopic/infinitesimal and history/becoming. But when it comes to discussing the 
three lines, subtle shifts occur in explication that make it difficult to understand how these 
two topologies relate. For example, while we are initially told that it is with molecular 
lines that ‘becomings emerge, occurring in a non-chronological time’, Bergen 
subsequently reveals that it is lines of flight ‘that are characterised by a primacy that is 
ontological and not chronological’ (Bergen 2009: 36-37). And as her analysis continues, 
lines of flight are described using the terms ‘micropolitics’, ‘evental efflugences’ and 
‘becoming’, in direct opposition to ‘macropolitics’, ‘the state of things’ and ‘history’ 
(Bergen 2009: 37). It is thus not surprising that when Bergen attempts to juxtapose the 
two topologies, she fails to refer to all three lines. As she says: ‘Mixing the types of lines 
- the molar being equivalent to hard segmentary lines, the molecular to quantum lines - 
the “molar” and the “molecular” compose a double mode of being, in immanence, which, 
in every assemblage, signals the existence of a virtual which insists as pure reserve and 
an actual without resemblance to the transcendental forge from which it emanates’ 
(Bergen 2009: 36). As we can see here, the dualistic molar/molecular schema is 
accounted for, but where are all three lines? If the molar term in the dualistic 
molar/molecular schema is equivalent to molar lines (rigid segmentary lines), then which 
line is equivalent to the molecular half? Bergen evades this question somewhat by 
referring to ‘quantum lines’, but which of the three lines are these? Molecular lines or 
lines of flight? To the best of my knowledge, the phrase ‘quantum lines’ never appears in 
Deleuze’s work – he instead refers to lines ‘marked by quanta’ or ‘with quanta’. But to be 
fair to Bergen, Deleuze is himself confused on this very question. Depending where you 
look, it can be either the second or third line that is ‘marked by quanta’ (compare Deleuze 
and Parnet 2002: 124 and Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 195 with Deleuze and Guattari 
1987: 222). The same problem can be found when tracking the respective dangers of the 
three lines. While falling/reverting into a black hole is at times said to be danger of the 
second molecular line, at others times this is the danger of lines of flight (compare 
Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 138 with Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 205). Thus while it is 
clear that molar lines hold up one half of the dualism, we are left to wonder by Bergen 
and [end of p. 242] Deleuze alike as to how the second and third lines conspire to form 
the other half, whether one takes the place of the other, and/or which one of them is 
‘becoming’ if it is the molar that is ‘history’.13 
 
What, then, are we to make of all this confusion? Are nomads molecular, or do they 
instead pursue a line of flight distinct from molecular lines? In light of the shifting and/or 
confused presentation of the material that I have highlighted – itself exacerbated by the 
fact that the texts we are drawing from here were written by three people, two of which 
never collaborated and could very well have penned the passages in question – we as 
Deleuzians are somewhat liberated to make of this political ontology-topology what we 
will (within limits, of course). Granted this licence, and contrary to the previous stated 
evidence that names the nomad as ‘the Deterritorialized par excellence’ and the ‘man of 
deterritorialization’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 134), I would suggest that if the nomad is 
to be the figure of transformation, then it might in fact be more appropriate to place him 
or her in the continually shifting and amorphous space in between the Romans and the 
advancing Huns. For is it not the barbarians who come closest to the ontology and ethic 
of transformation? The Huns are sure of their task – destruction of the State – but the 
barbarians, by contrast, have mastered the art of disguise and metamorphosis, continually 
going between the Romans and the Huns, becoming one, passing off as another, and then 
taking up arms against either or both. It is the barbarians, in other words, that are truly 
between known and immutable identities. As Deleuze and Guattari note at one point: ‘It 
is odd how supple segmentarity is caught between the two other lines, ready to tip to one 
side or the other; such is its ambiguity’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 205). But is not this 
‘oddity’ precisely the essence of metamorphosis and transmutation? Is not this 
‘ambiguity’, as opposed to pure being or pure becoming, precisely what is so ‘Interesting, 
Remarkable, and Important’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 82)? Such, in my opinion, is the 
virtue of this other transformative figure, or second force of nomadism, who moves 
between purities – the molecular barbarians, or what we might possibly think of as the 
real (but not absolute) nomads of Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadology.14 
 
The majority of Deleuze’s pragmatic and prescriptive moments support this reading. 
Invariably, every call made by Deleuze for ‘revolutionary becoming’ is tempered with a 
precautionary reminder. To demonstrate, witness the conclusion to the ‘Many Politics’ 
essay (which is then replicated and developed further in the ‘Micropolitics’ plateau). 
Firstly, dissolution of the State and the line of rigid segmentarity is not the point in itself. 
As Deleuze says: [end of p. 243] 
 
Even if we had the power to blow it up, could we succeed in doing so without 
destroying ourselves, since it is so much a part of the conditions of life, including 
our organism and our very reason? The prudence with which we must manipulate 
that line, the precautions we must take to soften it, to suspend it, to divert it, to 
undermine it, testify to a long labour which is not merely aimed against the State 
and the powers that be, but directly at ourselves. (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 138) 
 
Secondly, to those who are too sure of their calling, Deleuze has the following to say: 
‘You have not taken enough precautions’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 138). ‘Precaution’, 
‘prudence’ – not exactly the words that would support a Deleuzian politics founded on 
the celebration of absolute deterritorialisation. In fact, in a direct response to those 
readers who would overly glorify (or attack) his analysis of becoming and 
deterritorialisation, Deleuze remarks: 
 
Some have said that we see the schizophrenic as the true revolutionary. We 
believe, rather, that schizophrenia is the descent of a molecular process into a 
black hole. Marginals have always inspired fear in us, and a slight horror. They 
are not clandestine enough. (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 139). 
 
Such ‘marginals’, in other words, are a bit too obvious. One should not be able to identify 
a nomad from their haircut. If it were that easy then genuine creation wouldn’t need 
encouraging or protecting. This is why the question of the revolution is so problematic: 
 
The question of a revolution has never been utopian spontaneity versus State 
organization. When we challenge the model of the State apparatus or of the party 
organization which is modelled on the conquest of that apparatus, we do not, 
however, fall into the grotesque alternatives: either that of appealing to a state of 
nature, to a spontaneous dynamic, or that of becoming the self-styled lucid 
thinker of an impossible revolution, whose very impossibility is such a source of 
pleasure. (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 145) 
 
We can thus see from these passages precisely who is not a true revolutionary for 
Deleuze: both acolytes of pure flux and ‘marginals’ will be incapable of thinking, let 
alone bringing about, a ‘new type of revolution’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 147)?15 This 
new type of revolution is not entirely sure of the way forward; it is not even always sure 
where the impediments are or who are the nomads. But it could not be otherwise, since 
 
we can’t be sure in advance how things will go. We can define different kinds of 
line, but that won’t tell us one’s good and another bad. We [end of p. 244] can’t 
assume that lines of flight are necessarily creative, that smooth spaces are always 
better than segmented or striated ones. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 33) 
 
A tempered position marked by prudence is therefore the most appealing. It is also the 
most difficult, and in a certain sense the most radical: as the molecular barbarians know, 
there is arguably nothing harder than charting one’s own path between a binary of 
oppositional lines. It is no doubt true that Deleuze often partakes in dualistic decisions, 
especially when it comes to the ontologies of becoming and being. But in the end, 
Deleuze always hopes to go beyond these, to itinerate between so that he can both 
become and defend against its dangers at the same time. This is why it is important to 
remember that what Deleuze calls ‘the crack’ (originally taken from F. Scott Fitzgerald’s 
autobiographical essay The Crack-Up16) in fact refers to the molecular or rhizomatic line 
in between the lines of rigid segmentary that ‘proceed by oversignificant breaks’ and the 
line of rupture: ‘Break line, crack line, rupture line’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 200). 
Only then can we understand the following guideline: 
 
Well then, are we to speak always about Bousquet’s wound, about Fitzgerald’s 
and Lowry’s alcoholism, Nietzsche’s and Artaud’s madness while remaining on 
the shore? […] Or should we go a short way further to see for ourselves, be a 
little alcoholic, a little crazy, a little suicidal, a little of a guerrilla – just enough to 
extend the crack, but not enough to deepen it irremedially? (Deleuze 1990: 157-8) 
 
Become a little bit, but not too much. Leave the shore, certainly, but do so in order that 
you may find a new land – do not hope to become irrevocably lost at sea. In other words, 
extend the crack and connect the rhizome, but do not become the rupture. When you do 
so, a line will be drawn that is distinguishable from both the inexpressive and the 
expressions of State segmentarity: a nomadic line that is invested with abstraction and 
connects with a matter-flow (that moves through it); a developmental line of becoming 
that is not enslaved to the incorporeal surface or corporeal depth, but is the progressive 
movement between them. That this line is distinct from the line of flight, yet also distinct 
from the striae that express and organise in an entirely different way (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 498), once again reaffirms the middle status of the nomad that I have re-
emphasised in this paper. [end of p. 245] 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
What, then, does it mean to be a real nomad or true revolutionary according to Deleuze’s 
political ontology? As we can now see, it is questionable whether an absolute nomad 
placed in binary opposition to the State is capable of living up to the real nature of 
Deleuze’s nomadism. This is because bringing down a State apparatus is insufficient on 
its own in responding to ‘the revolutionary problem’, since there is every chance (as 
history well shows us) that a revolutionary force will become despotic. Revolutionary 
forces and becomings thus cannot be simply ascribed to those who call for the Revolution 
and devote their waking lives to its fulfilment, for not only is it difficult to determine who 
is a nomad or what is a smooth space by appearance, but the nomad and the smooth are 
themselves susceptible to appropriation by the State and the striated. These 
appropriations can occur, furthermore, not simply through the transformation of what was 
once nomadic-smooth into something statist-striated, but even more worryingly through a 
maintenance of its nature redirected towards other ends. As Deleuze and Guattari warn: 
‘We say this as a reminder that smooth space and the form of exteriority do not have an 
irresistible revolutionary calling but change meaning drastically depending on the 
interactions they are part of and the concrete conditions of their exercise of 
establishment’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 387). 
 
As for who are our nomads today, our true revolutionaries…? Ultimately, this is a 
question to which Deleuze’s practice of thought brings us rather than answers – or 
perhaps more specifically, rephrases and reapproaches as follows: where are your lines, 
your breaks, cracks and ruptures? Do you recognise these lines in yourself or the various 
organisations you are a part of?17 Chances are you will – if Deleuze is correct, then there 
is a little bit of each in all of us. And chances are that this evaluation can aid in avoiding 
formations that slide dangerously to one side. If we are thus unable to name names in our 
search for nomads and revolutionaries, what I think we can safely say is that to be a real 
nomad or revolutionary in the Deleuzian sense, one must be attuned to the different lines 
that we are composed of, maintain an appropriate respect for each of them (without 
collapsing one onto the other), and pursue any engagement and experimentation between 
them with a healthy dose of ‘prudence’ and ‘precaution’. For it is only through such a 
practice that creativity and transformation can not only [end of p. 246] be embarked 
upon, but concretely realised in a strata of organisation that facilitates life. 
 
 
Notes 
 
                                                
 
1 For a comprehensive survey of the field of Deleuze and politics, see Gilbert 2009. 
2 Nicholas Thoburn poses a similar question to this in his excellent piece “What is a Militant?” 
(Thoburn 2008). Thoburn’s pursuit of this question takes the form of a critique of militant groups 
(in particular the Weatherman group) through the use of Deleuzian philosophy. My paper, in 
contrast, will provide a description of this philosophy, followed by a critical analysis of it, for the 
purposes of addressing a Deleuzian problematic. Thoburn’s paper, furthermore, does not really 
complicate the notion of the militant, but on the contrary specifies and clarifies the figure of the 
militant, before going on to suggest an a-militant alternative. In distinction to this, my paper will 
demonstrate the complexities involved in determining the figure of the nomad, and will suggest 
that there might be more than one alternative. For these reasons and more, I would consider our 
papers to be both distinct and complementary. 
I would furthermore consider my paper to be distinct from and complementary to that of 
Véronique Bergen’s “Politics as the Orientation of Every Assemblage” (2009). As with Bergen’s 
analysis, my paper will emphasise the significance of topology to Deleuze’s political ontology. 
This analysis, however, will subsequently proceed to a critique of this political ontology that 
reveals insights absent in Bergen’s paper. 
3 Deleuze is of course not the first or last person to identify this revolutionary problem. The 
purpose of this paper, however, is not so much to integrate Deleuze with other literature on the 
topic, but rather to articulate more specifically the nature of Deleuze’s response to this 
problematic, and by doing so complicate the dualistic tropes upon which much Deleuzian 
political philosophy rests, whether normative or descriptive. 
4 While much of what I will describe in the first section of the paper is no doubt familiar to 
learned Deleuzians, I would point out that it nevertheless remains necessary to state the basic 
concepts and standard positions of Deleuzian thought that this paper will subsequently attempt to 
complexify and challenge. 
5 See also Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 369, where nomos is opposed to logos: ‘there is an 
opposition between the logos and the nomos, the law and the nomos’. 
6 See also Deleuze 1990: 75, where nomadic distribution is explained as ‘distributing in an open 
space instead of distributing a closed space’. 
7 For further evidence of how Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the nomad/State and 
smooth/striated is derived from Bergson’s theory of multiplicities, see Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 
477, 479 and 488. 
8 For a fuller analysis of the Nomadology that chronicles the plateau’s movements (from dualism 
to a triad to monism and pluralism) see chapter 3 of Lundy 2012. 
9 For the Boulez reference, see Boulez 1971: 87 (translation modified). For more on the 
dissymmetrical passages between and transmutations of the smooth and the striated, see Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 474, 480, 482, 486, 493 and 500. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
10 See also Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 202: ‘Individual or group, we are traversed by lines, 
meridians, geodesics, tropics, and zones marching to different beats and differing in nature.’ 
11 See Deleuze 1990: 154-161. 
12 For one amongst numerous examples of this, see Buchanan 2008: 16-17. [end of p. 247] 
13 For one further example, see Gilbert 2009: 18. As we find here, the major/minor schema is 
invoked, molar lines are affiliated with the ‘major’, lines of flight with the ‘minor’, and there is 
no mention of molecular lines. Gilbert, it must be said, is only referring to these issues in passing, 
as opposed to Zourabichvili and Bergen’s more direct/extensive treatments. But it is for this 
reason that I would bring attention to this example – for if the reconciliation of the two 
topological schemas is perennially passed over as a problem within the literature on Deleuze and 
politics, it is for the most part due to such pervasive casual references to and uses of the relevant 
terms. 
14 I am willing to concede that this advocation of the molecular barbarian over the nomadic 
rupture is, to a certain extent, rhetorical. However, given the paucity of coverage within the 
secondary literature of this middle figure, in between the nomad and State, I would argue that this 
polemical treatment is justified. One could note, for instance, that it is far more common to find 
within the secondary literature on Deleuze a defence of the State and the virtues of molarity than 
it is to find any discussion of molecular barbarians – their positive features and their distinction 
from both the nomad and State. 
15 Thoburn’s investigation into ‘what is a militant’ also arrives at this point (Thoburn 2008: 114). 
I would point out, however, that Thoburn’s route to this conclusion is quite distinct from mine. 
16 See Fitzgerald, 1945. 
17 As Deleuze puts it: ‘This is why the questions of schizoanalysis or pragmatics, micro-politics 
itself, never consists in interpreting, but merely in asking what are your lines, individual or group, 
and what are the dangers on each’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 143). In drawing attention to this 
feature, it must be noted that I do not mean to suggest that the question of ‘who’ is a bad one or 
needs replacing with the question of ‘where’. While I would not disagree with commentators who 
suggest that the question of ‘where’ is of the utmost importance to a Deleuzian politics (Bergen 
2009: 34-5), what my analysis has endeavoured to demonstrate is no more or less than the manner 
in which the questions of ‘who’, ‘where’ and ‘what’ are intertwined in Deleuze’s thought – a 
feature that is perhaps most evident in Deleuze’s final book with Guattari, in which all of these 
questions are posed and shown to inform one another. At any rate, the question of ‘who are our 
nomads today?’ is Deleuze’s own question (Deleuze 2004: 260), and thus one that is presumably 
worth pursuing within Deleuzian thought, even if or when this pursuit involves forays into 
topology. 
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